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ABSTRACT 
Humans learn to represent complex structures (e.g., natural language, music, mathematics) 
from experience with their environments. Often such structures are latent, hidden, or not 
encoded in statistics about sensory representations alone. Accounts of human cognition have 
long emphasized the importance of structured representations, yet the majority of 
contemporary neural networks do not learn structure from experience. Here we describe one 
way that structured, functionally-symbolic representations can be instantiated in an artificial 
neural network. Then, we describe how such latent structures (viz., predicates) can be learned 
from experience with unstructured data. Our approach exploits two principles from psychology 
and neuroscience: comparison of representations, and the naturally occurring dynamic 
properties of distributed computing across neuronal assemblies (viz., neural oscillations). We 
discuss how the ability to learn predicates from experience, to represent information 
compositionally, and to extrapolate knowledge to unseen data is core to understanding and 
modeling the most complex human behaviors (e.g., relational reasoning, analogy, language 
processing, game play). 
 
KEYWORDS: predicate learning, artificial neural networks, structured representations, neural 
oscillations, desynchronization 
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INTRODUCTION 
As humans, we recognize our home, pet, or partner regardless of our viewing angle and the 
concomitant variation in the 2-D image on our retinas (e.g., [1]). Similarly, when we listen to 
speech or view sign, we understand linguistic structures that go far beyond any physical 
description of the stimulus (e.g., [2-4]). Furthermore, we have the capacity to promiscuously 
apply what we know to new situations, for example, if we have to improvise a recipe with novel 
ingredients, we would never entertain cooking something by refrigerating it.1 These examples 
emphasize several things. First, the ability to use 'incomplete' or partial sensory experience to 
infer the latent structures in the environment [5], and then reason and generalize based on these 
structures [6], appears to be crucial for everyday human behavior. Second, the domains where 
humans outperform artificial intelligence systems (AI) seem to involve inference beyond lower 
order statistical relationships [7]. While it is clear that, in the limit, AI can outmatch human 
performance on pure computation and statistical tasks (e.g., medical imaging), it is not clear 
how domains that require inference (e.g., analogy, scene comprehension), decision making 
(e.g., diagnosis, game play), or abstract rule generation (e.g., natural language) can be 
approached without a profound change in the principles of computation currently being 
espoused in the mainstream of both cognitive science and AI (for discussion see [4-7].  
Here we argue that the capacity to learn structured (i.e., symbolic) representations from 
experience underlies the flexible, extrapolatory nature of human behavior [6, 8, 9]. We 
summarize the computational principles needed to instantiate structured representations (viz., 
predicates) in an artificial neural network [see also 10], and we describe how predicates can be 
learned from unstructured data in an approach we call predicate learning. Predicate learning 
represents the integration of formal symbolic models with traditional neural computing 
principles and capitalizes on the information carried by oscillatory rhythms of neuronal 
computation.  
 
The generalization problem and structured representations  
Advances in AI and machine learning [11] have produced deep neural network (DNN) 
systems that reach and even exceed human levels of performance on a range of cognitive tasks 
[12]. DNNs can learn to perform a variety of tasks without any prior representations or 
knowledge (e.g., to play an Atari video game from pixel data and game scores, see [12]), but it 
is well known that DNNs struggle with tasks that require generalization to input from outside 
the bounds of the training set (c.f., ranging from object recognition, inference, analogy, natural 
language; [7, 8]). DNNs' explicit (and intentional) lack of structured representations likely 
plays a role in this struggle, because accounts of how humans generalize tend to rely on 
powerful symbolic languages [6, 10, 13]. An important reason these languages are so powerful 
is that they include predicates. A predicate is a data structure that can take (i.e., be bound to) 
arguments. Formally, a predicate is a function that takes some argument(s) and returns a truth 
value (e.g., specifying whether the argument(s) are members of a set). Functionally, a predicate 
can be understood as specifying a property about its arguments. For example, the predicate 
red(x) specifies the property of redness about the argument x.  
Predicates are suitable means for the flexible transfer of information across contexts 
because the same representation can be used to effectively characterize wildly different input 
data (e.g., the predicate contains can be applied to broccoli and iron, but also to houses and 
rooms, or to first-order logic and quantification). However, the contemporary models that 
instantiate structured representations face a complementary challenge compared to DNNs: 
these structured models require specification, by the modeler, of a collection of necessary 
                                                          
1 For recipes generated by deep learning networks, see 
https://www.dailydot.com/unclick/neural-network-recipe-generator/ 
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representational structures in advance of any actual learning; in other words, they do not learn 
the contents of their structures directly from the environment without the use of pre-specified 
representations and rules [cf. 9, 14-16]. That is, while structure-based models generalize more 
flexibly than DNNs, they do not perform general "from scratch" learning because they feature 
symbolic representations that are specified a priori by the modeler [e.g., 9, 15, 16].  As a result, 
structured models often make strong nativist claims, for example, that a large set of 
representational elements and the rules for building compositions of these elements must be 
innate [17]. From a practical point of view, structured models that do no learn their structures 
can only be applied to problems for which a solution is already known because the relevant 
structures must be specified before the model runs.  
 
Instantiation of predicates in artificial neural networks 
A key notion for the instantiation of structured representations is binding. Importantly, the 
mechanism for binding predicates to arguments must meet two requirements [18, 19]. First, the 
mechanism that carries binding information must be completely independent of the 
representational elements that specify the identity of the active objects and predicates. For 
example, the representational elements long-haired and cat, and short-haired and dog might 
be bound to form the propositions long-haired(cat) and short-haired(dog). While the statement 
long-haired(cat) has meaning (a cat that has the property of having long hair) the elements 
long-hair and cat remain independent when so bound. That is, the predicate long-hair means 
the same thing whether it is bound to ‘cat’, ‘dog’, or ‘automobile’. Second, the binding tag (the 
signal carrying the binding information) must be dynamic. That is, it must allow bindings to be 
created and destroyed on the fly. For instance, if the cat in the above example gets a short hair-
cut, the binding of long-haired and cat must be broken, and the very-same representation of cat 
must be bound to the short-haired predicate to form short-haired(cat) where the same 
representational element coding for short-haired in short-haired(dog) is bound to exactly the 
same representational element coding for the cat in long-haired(cat).  
Binding of structured representations has been instantiated in neural networks in 
various forms since the early 1990s [19-22]. The majority of approaches have used synchrony 
of firing to bind an argument [19-22], though, we note synchrony-based systems do not learn 
predicates from unstructured data because they cannot separate predicates from their arguments 
without implementing separate data types a priori. Below we describe a predicate instantiation 
that exploits the asynchrony of unit firing (for the computing relevance of asynchrony see also 
[23]) in order to represent a predicate, role, and argument. The architecture, called DORA 
(Discovery of Relations by Analogy; [4, 8, 24]), is descended from the symbolic-connectionist 
system LISA [Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies; 21, 22].  DORA is based 
on two fundamental concepts from cognitive science and neuroscience: (1) that learning and 
generalization depend upon a process of comparison [25], and (2) that information in neural 
computing systems can be carried by the oscillations that emerge as its component units fire 
[19, 25, 26].  
 
A model for predicate learning  
DORA (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; Doumas et al., 2008) is a neural network model 
that learns to represent structured (i.e., functionally symbolic) representations from 
unstructured examples without feedback. DORA is descended from of the symbolic-
connectionist system LISA (Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies; [20, 21]). 
DORA Below we describe DORA’s architecture and operations only in functional terms for 
the purposes of brevity. The complete model including all implementational details can be 
found in [8, 24].  
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The basic network macrostructure is presented in Fig. 1. DORA is consists of a long-
term memory (LTM) composed of layers of bidirectionally connected units—we refer to these 
units as tokens. Token units are yoked to integrative inhibitors that integrate input from their 
yoked unit and active token units in higher layers, and fire after reaching a threshold. The yoked 
inhibitors serve the purpose of supporting phasic firing and implementing refractory periods in 
the token units. The bottom layer of token units is connected to a pool of feature units, which 
serve as distributed representations of objects in the world (initially), and (after learning) 
predicates. Features can be any kind of vector-based representations specified by the modeller, 
to raw pixels from an image.  
 
 
Figure 1. Macrostructure of the DORA model. Adopted from [8].  
 
Units in LTM become potentiated, and enter floating memory sets, which can be 
interpreted as analogues of attention and working memory (WM; [27, 28]). One such set, the 
driver, corresponds to DORA’s current focus of attention (e.g., a proposition in a story, or an 
image). A second set, the recipient, corresponds to DORA’s active memory (AM; e.g., items 
from LTM that the DORA has retrieved based on its current focus of attention). A third set, the 
emerging memory (EM), corresponds to new or refined representations that the model learns 
(e.g., schemas; see [24]). Token units within driver, recipient, and EM are laterally inhibitive 
(units in the same layer inhibit one another). The above is a way to interpret the function of 
these sets in the common jargon of cognitive psychology. 
Activation in DORA flows from the driver to the recipient and the rest of LTM via the 
shared feature units. DORA’s basic processing is summarised in Table 1. In brief, DORA starts 
with some representation in the driver. Activation flows from the driver to the rest of LTM via 
the shared feature units, and DORA will retrieve representations into AM (i.e., units from LTM 
become potentiated and enter AM; retrieval occurs via a Luce choice rule [29]). After retrieval, 
as units in the driver become active, they will produce patterns of activation on units in AM 
(again, via shared feature units). Excitatory connections, called mapping connections, are 
learned within-layer between co-active units in driver and recipient via a modified Hebbian 
algorithm [20, 24]. Based on any mapping connections DORA discovers, it will learn new 
representations or schemas, or it will perform relational generalisation, the application of 
structure to another situation or set of inputs based on systematic correspondence between 
mapping connections.  
 
Table 1. Basic processing in the model (adopted from Doumas et al., 2008, Appendix 
A).  
1. Representations (objects or entire propositions) enter the driver.  
2. Activation flows from the driver to the rest of the network via shared feature 
units.  
3. If nothing in recipient:   
a. DORA attempts retrieval via Luce choice rule.  
4. If representations in recipient: 
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a. If no mapping connections: 
i. Mapping via modified Hebbian algorithm (Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997).  
b. If mapping connections: 
i. Learns new representations or refines representations via 
comparison-based learning (Doumas et al., 2008).  
ii. Generalises via relational generalisation algorithm (Doumas et 
al., 2008; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003).  
 
Below we describe some of the key elements of DORA’s processing in more detail. We 
focus on two key mechanisms, time-based binding, and new representation learning. We begin 
by describing the end state of DORA’s learning: fully instantiated relational propositions. We 
then describe how DORA learns these representations from unstructured representations of 
objects.  Full details of these operations are reported in [8, 24].  
 
Time-based binding  
After learning, symbolic propositions are represented by a hierarchy of distributed and localist 
codes (see Figure 2a). At the lowest layer, feature units code the features of objects and roles 
in a distributed fashion. In the next layer, localist predicate-object units (POs) conjunctively 
code for individual predicates (or roles) and objects. In the next layer, localist role-binding 
units (RBs) link object and relational role PO units into specific role-filler pairs. Finally, 
localist P units link RBs into whole relational propositions. For example, a proposition like 
contain(obj1, obj2) is represented as the container role linked to obj1 via an RB unit, and the 
contained role to obj2 via an RB unit, and both of these RBs linked via a P unit to form the 
relational proposition contain (obj1, obj2).  
While this encoding is sufficient for long-term storage, it fails as an instantiation of 
dynamic binding: Binding information is carried by conjunctive units that definitionally defy 
predicate argument independence. In order to successfully instantiate functional predicates, the 
model must be able to dynamically bind predicates to arguments. In DORA, dynamic binding 
information is carried using time.  
When a proposition like the one in Figure 2a is in the driver and becomes active, lateral 
inhibition and the yoked inhibitors will produce a systematic and repeating firing pattern. In 
brief, bound predicates and arguments will fire in direct sequence and out of synchrony with 
other bound predicates and arguments (Figure 2b). As the proposition becomes active (i.e., the 
P unit is activated), activation spreads to RB units which compete to become active. One of the 
RB units will win the competition, becoming more active and inhibiting the other (Figure 2bi). 
The active RB unit will activate its PO units, which will similarly compete to become active. 
The predicate might become active first (Figure 2bi), and after its yoked inhibitor fires, the 
bound argument will become active (Figure 2bii). When the active RB’s yoked inhibitor fires, 
the next RB unit will become active (Figure 2biii) and will similarly activate its predicate and 
argument in sequence (Figure 2biii-iv). In short, binding information is carried dynamically in 
the units that maintain role-filler independence (the PO and feature units) by the sequence of 
firing (the same units could represent the inverse role-binding—container to obj2 and 
contained to obj1—simply by changing the order of firing). Figure 2c presents the same 
information in a wave diagram. These activation patterns give rise of oscillatory activity of 
units throughout the network, forming ‘neural’ oscillations.  
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Figure 2. Symbolic propositions and binding in DORA. (a) A relational proposition represented 
in the DORA architecture. (b) Time-based binding (asynchronous or phase-lag 1) in DORA. 
(i) The representation the token and feature units representing the container role become active. 
(ii) The representation the token and feature units representing obj1 become active, marking it 
as bound to the container role (as they fire in direct sequence). (iii) The representation the token 
and feature units representing the contained role become active. (iv) The representation the 
token and feature units representing obj2 become active, marking it as bound to the contained 
role (as they fire in direct sequence). (c) Binding information from (b) represented in a wave 
diagram.  
 
 
Learning predicates using neural oscillations 
At a basic level, DORA uses comparison to isolate shared properties of objects (represented in 
the feature unit layer) and to represent them as explicit structures. DORA starts with 
representations of objects encoded as simple feature-vectors (i.e., a token unit connected to set 
of features describing that object). If DORA successfully maps an object in the driver to an 
object in the recipient, then these representations will become co-active, and corresponding 
features of the two representations will fire simultaneously, effectively comparing or 
superimposing the activation pattern of their features in the feature layer. For example, when 
DORA compares a square that is inside some object to a triangle that is inside some other object 
(e.g., the square inside the shield and triangle inside the circle in the first row of Figure 1), then 
the nodes representing the square and triangle fire together (Figure 3a). Any features that are 
shared by both compared objects (i.e., features common to both the square and the triangle) 
receive twice as much input and thus become roughly twice as active as features connected to 
one but not the other (Figure 3a). DORA uses a self-supervised learning algorithm we call 
comparison-based learning (CBL) to learn an explicit predicate representation of the featural 
overlap of the co-active objects.  
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Figure 3. Learning a new predicate representation in DORA. (a) Two objects (obj1 and obj2) 
are compared (i.e., co-activated) and mapped (solid red arrowed lines). (b) Units are recruited 
and activated in the RB layer and PO layer (see text). (c) DORA learned connections between 
active units via Hebbian learning (arrowed lines indicate newly learned connections; solid lines 
= stronger connections, dashed lines = weaker connections). (d) DORA has learned a 
representation of a new predicate that can be bound to obj2 via time-based binding.  
 
During CBL, for any layer above a layer with active tokens, DORA recruits and 
activates a token unit if none are already active (Figure 3b). When only single PO units are 
active, DORA also recruits and activates a PO token unit (Figure 3b). Connections between 
token units in adjacent layers are updated via a simple Hebbian rule. Because the strength of 
connections learned via Hebbian learning is a function of the units’ activations, DORA learns 
stronger connections between the new PO unit and more active feature units (Figure 3c).  The 
new PO thus becomes an explicit representation of the featural overlap of the compared objects 
(in this case the invariant properties of a “container”; see [8, 23] for discussion of what these 
properties might be). In addition, DORA learns a conjunctive link between the recruited PO 
and the object in AM. The new PO unit serves as an explicit and functional single-place 
predicate (Figure 3d), dynamically bound to its object when if it enters the driver in the future 
(see above).  
The same algorithm also allows DORA to link sets of co-occurring predicate-argument 
pairs into multi-place relations. If a set of predicate-object pairs co-occur they will be in the 
driver together. If DORA has previously encountered the same set of predicate-object pairs and 
encoded them in LTM, they can be retrieved into AM. When these representations are then 
mapped, CBL will result in a recruited P unit, which will learn connections to the RB units of 
the predicate-object pairs. The result is a multi-place symbolic relation similar to the one 
described in the previous section. Note that predicates and objects are not different datatypes 
in this architecture. 
The DORA learning algorithm makes two interesting predictions about human mental 
representations. First, and most importantly, it suggests that we represent multi-place relations 
as linked sets of single-place predicates. Such a representational system is known as a role-
binding calculus, and there exists a large body of evidence that human mental representations 
might indeed conform to it [18, 20, 30]. Second, it makes the prediction that humans should 
represent the constituent roles of a relation before they represent the relation as a unified whole. 
This prediction appears true of children (e.g., [31]).  
DORA and the predicate learning approach has account for a wide-range of phenomena 
in relational reasoning, analogy, cognitive development, and language processing [for a review 
see Doumas & Martin, 2018]. Most recently we have used the approach to demonstrate human 
level extrapolatory generalization in artificial environments [8]. We augmented DORA with a 
simple visual pre-processor to perform object detection and allowed it to learn predicates from 
screen shots of the Atari game Breakout. We then used tabular q-learning to teach DORA to 
use the representations that it had previously learned to play Breakout successfully. Breakout 
requires the player to move a paddle on the horizontally in order to hit a ball at bricks at the 
top of the screen. DORA was then able to transfer its knowledge of Breakout to the Atari game 
Pong, in which the player moves a paddle vertically to play a simple tennis-like game. Using 
the predicate representations that it had learned playing Breakout, DORA discovered the 
systematic correspondences between the two games (both involve keeping a ball in play using 
a paddle) and was able to successfully play Pong at above human levels with no additional 
training. By contrast, state of the art DNNs (e.g., a DQN based on [12]) completely failed to 
generalize to Pong based on training in Breakout. Our system was able to match and surpass 
human performance on Breakout and Pong, and importantly, it was also able to successfully 
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return to playing Breakout after it played Pong, a simple task for humans that current non-
structured systems fail at without specialized interleaved training routines. 
 
Neural oscillations as the rhythms of computation 
Predicate learning exploits a core set of neurophysiological computing principles, namely that 
computation in a neural network is rhythmic. Most crucially, predicates, once learned, are 
dynamically bound to their arguments by phase-lag, which is expressed as systematic 
asynchrony of unit firing [19, 23, 26], or desynchronization between the activation cycles of 
the nodes coding predicates and arguments (Figure 2). During asynchrony-based—or phase-
lag-1—binding, as a predicate or proposition becomes active, bound arguments and predicates 
fire in direct sequence, and out of synchrony with other bound predicate-arguments sets. This 
feature is what allows the system to maintain independence between a predicate and its 
argument(s) and achieve variable-value independence [4, 10, 18]. At the same time, binding 
information is carried in the proximity of firing (e.g., with predicates firing directly before their 
arguments), meaning that representing predicates in a neural system relies critically on 
sensitivity to time, and rhythm, as dimensions of computation. Synchrony-based—or phase-
lag-0—binding also occurs in the system depending on the computational goal, for example, a 
proposition can be activated by having its bound arguments and predicate fire together, but out 
of synchrony with other bound role-filler sets, in order to perform propositional-level 
computation of higher arities. By grouping representations into phase sets, or what is in and 
out of phase in the network, the system uses the rhythms of computation to both separate and 
combine information as needed. 
Cortical oscillations have long been implicated as the indices of neural information 
processing [32]. Predicate learning in an artificial neural network relies on exploiting the 
naturally occurring “neural” oscillations of distributed computation over time. Being sensitive 
to how information is carried in time in a neural system implies that the dynamics of the system 
can themselves be learned from. A similar principle appears in the dynamic reorganization of 
cortical networks during learning in humans (e.g., [33]). Using oscillatory assembly activation 
to compute and to learn is potentially transformative, not only for its computational power (e.g., 
being able to learn from past states and learn relations over multiple time points and states), 
but also for the mechanistic link to neuroscientific theory and data (neural oscillations), and to 
formal accounts of cognition, including formalism of natural language and predicate calculi [4, 
6, 15, 16, 18, 34].Computing with neural oscillations represents a fundamental formal and 
neurophysiological synthesis between how human-like representations can be achieved in an 
artificial system that learns, and how distributed neural computing systems, including neuronal 
assemblies in biological brains, process information.  
Predicate learning offers an account of how complex concepts might develop in neural 
computation systems without the need to hardwire or encode a priori structure, a theoretical 
and implementational limitation of current structure-based accounts of cognition (e.g., [6, 9, 
15, 16]), and offers a solution to the classic generalization problem that unstructured deep-
learning systems face (e.g., [11,12]). A system that uses predicate learning can discover and 
predicate what is latent in the environment, and discover what is relevant for behavior.  
Predicate learning ultimately relies on the capacity of a system to be compositional - to host 
representations that can be combined without changing core representations in order to flexibly 
generate new representations as the environment and behavior require. 
In sum, we have described in brief how predicates can be learned from unstructured 
data using rhythmic, desynchronized neural oscillations. Learning symbolic structure from 
signals that naturally occur in distributed computing systems offers a promising approach 
whereby the computational principles that can yield the highest forms of the human mind (e.g., 
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relational reasoning, formal and natural language processing) can also be realized in systems 
based on the computational primitives of neurophysiology.  
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